war rooms: interiors under siege in beirut and baghdad

Endriana Audisho
University of Technology Sydney
0000-0002-5826-0687

abstract

Few forces disrupt the stability of architectural planning and the intended use of interior spaces more profoundly than conflict. In cities marked by war, interiors become sites of both resistance and adaptation, where the prescribed ideals of design are reshaped by the exigencies of survival, displacement, and the reorganisation of social and spatial orders. Historically, certain architectural typologies, particularly hotels, have had their interiors reconfigured in unplanned ways, repurposed for strategic, functional, and humanitarian roles that position them at the centre of conflict.

This essay examines the interiors of two such hotels — the Holiday Inn in Beirut and the Al-Rashid Hotel in Baghdad — to explore how their spaces were reconfigured during conflict in response to distinct geopolitical and military needs. During the Lebanese Civil War's 'Battle of the Hotels' (1975–1976), the Holiday Inn, situated along what was rapidly emerging as Beirut's Green Line, was transformed into a fortified military stronghold. Its upper floors and rooftop were converted into sniper positions, turning the interior into a key site of resistance. In contrast, during the Gulf War in 1991, the Al-Rashid Hotel became a media hub for international correspondents. Journalists from Cable News Network navigated its interior features, such as strip windows and expansive rooms, to provide 24-hour real-time coverage of the war.

The following analysis employs a methodology that draws on journalistic accounts from both case studies. These include textual, visual, and video media, which are synthesised to bring together heterogeneous sources and spatialise the transformations of space under siege. By examining these unplanned conditions, the essay argues that architecture responds to the shifting moral, social, and spatial contexts of conflict. Methods of composite analytic drawing are used to visualise how space is reconfigured under siege, and reframes hotel interiors as contingent infrastructures that unsettle assumptions about planning and design. These case studies highlight how architecture is reshaped in times of crisis, revealing its entanglement with the evolving realities of conflict.

keywords

urban warfare; geopolitics; media narratives; architecture; interiors

cite as:
Endriana Audisho, 'War Rooms: Interiors Under Siege in Beirut and Baghdad,' *Idea Journal*, 22.1 (2025), pp. 68–82, doi.org/10.37113/ij.v22i1.600.

introduction: interiors at war

Conflict challenges the very premise of architectural design, which assumes that space can be planned, contained, and stably occupied. In cities marked by war, interiors become highly adaptive, responding to conditions that exceed or contradict their original purpose. While architecture is often analysed through its formal or aesthetic qualities, less attention has been paid to the spatial politics of interiors under siege. In such contexts, interior space is neither neutral nor peripheral. It becomes central to the choreography of crisis, hosting military operations, enabling media performance, and reorganising itself in response to shifting political, technological, and logistical demands. In this sense, these are unplanned interiors: spaces whose intended functions collapse under the pressures of conflict and are reconfigured through contingent, improvised use.

Hotels are particularly susceptible to these transformations.[1] Their central locations, ambiguous public-private status, and ready-made infrastructure make them both strategically valuable and symbolically charged during wartime. This essay positions hotel interiors as critical yet underexamined sites within the urban theatre of conflict. Focusing on two case studies — the Holiday Inn in Beirut during the Battle of the Hotels (1975–1976) and the Al-Rashid Hotel in Baghdad during the Gulf War (1991) — the essay explores how hotel interiors were reconfigured in response to distinct military, geopolitical, and media imperatives. Although these events differ in their legal and political contexts, with the former a civil war fought by militias and the latter an international war between state actors, both hotels became central nodes in the spatial and symbolic infrastructure of their respective conflicts. One was militarised, the other mediatised; both were radically transformed from within.

The analysis draws on journalistic accounts as well as photographic and video media and contributes original composite analytic drawings to spatialise how each hotel's interiors were reconfigured under siege. The evidentiary terrain is uneven. The Holiday Inn is extensively documented through photographs, news footage, and retrospective accounts, whereas the Al-Rashid Hotel survives largely through the live audio of Cable News Network (CNN) broadcasts. This imbalance is not a limitation but a condition of analysis, foregrounding how conflict produces uneven forms of mediation and visibility, and necessitating methods that weigh partial, biased, and often speculative evidence against one another. Conceptually, the essay draws on spatial and media theory: Eyal Weizman's concept of the politics of verticality informs the reading of the Holiday Inn; Paul Virilio's writings on speed and vision frame the Al-Rashid; Jean Baudrillard's critique of hyperreality sharpens the analysis of how war was consumed as a spectacle; and Beatriz Colomina's work situates architecture within systems of publicity and media. Together, these lenses offer insight into how hotel interiors, materially and symbolically, become implicated in the shifting logics of urban warfare and its mediatised representation. In this way, the essay makes both methodological and conceptual contributions to the study of unplanned interiors.

case study one — the militarised interior: the holiday inn, beirut

the battle of the hotels: urban conflict on the green line

In April 1975, the first confrontations of what would become a fifteen-year civil war erupted on the streets of Beirut. The immediate trigger came on 13 April when Phalangist gunmen ambushed a bus carrying Palestinian passengers in Ain al-Rummaneh, killing twenty-seven. This was a retaliatory act following an earlier shooting outside a nearby church.[2] The roots of the conflict, however, were far more complex. Lebanon's fragile confessional political system, the regional fallout from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and tensions between Christian conservatives and Muslim progressives collided within Beirut's dense urban fabric. The influx of Palestinian refugees after 1967 altered the city's demographics, exacerbating political disputes over Lebanon's national identity and its relationship to Arab regional struggles.[3]

As sectarian divisions hardened, the city itself was physically and symbolically split. East Beirut became predominantly controlled by Christian factions, while western sectors fell under Muslim and leftist forces. The contested boundary that separated the two sides was a shifting and violently enforced frontier that became known as the 'Green Line.'[4] The brutality and spatial complexity of this urban war were most visible along the coastal hotel district of Minet el Hosn, an area that, until hostilities broke out, had embodied Beirut's image of luxury, commerce, and modernity. During the so-called 'Golden Age' of the 1950s and 1960s, Beirut had been dubbed the 'Paris of the Middle East' and 'Switzerland of the East,' titles that highlighted its role as a financial and tourist hub. Nowhere was this identity more concentrated than in the hotel district, where developments signalled Lebanon's integration into global networks of capital, leisure, and diplomacy. But as political geographer Sara Fregonese notes, Beirut's hotel district was itself a 'very specific product of a precise geopolitical project.'[5] This carefully curated image was vulnerable to collapse.

That collapse began with the outbreak of the 'Battle of the Hotels,' a protracted confrontation that transformed the district from a site of opulence into a battlefield.[6] What unfolded was not merely the repurposing of architecture for combat but the violent subversion of Beirut's urban identity, in which icons of modernity were co-opted as instruments of war. The fighting, which escalated intermittently between October 1975 and March 1976, marked the first major confrontation between the Christian Lebanese Front, a coalition of right-wing Christian nationalist factions led by the Phalangist Party, and the leftist Lebanese National Movement (LNM), which included Muslim militias and Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) forces.[7] By late October, leftist militias seized the Murr Tower, establishing a fortified vantage point overlooking Christian-controlled East Beirut.[8] In response, the Phalangists launched a counteroffensive, capturing the Holiday Inn and neighbouring hotels on 27 October.[9] As the battle dragged on, control of the hotel district moved between factions, with repeated ceasefires, evacuations, and offensives. By March 1976, after months of combat, leftist forces captured the Holiday Inn, marking both a strategic and psychological turning point in the conflict.[10]

The Battle of the Hotels was both strategic and symbolic. Control of the district offered commanding views of Beirut's port, central business areas, and key transport corridors. Architecturally, the high-rise hotels, most notably the twenty-six-storey Holiday Inn, the twenty-storey Phoenicia, and the unfinished forty-storey Murr Tower, offered unparalleled vertical dominance.[11] As Morrison and El Binni observe, the hotels became an 'epicentre of fierce, unrelenting fighting' as rival militias vied for control of these high points.[12] The battle's symbolic dimensions were equally potent. As Nadine Hindi argues, the seizure of the district by leftist militias, particularly under the banner of anti-capitalist resistance, represented an attack on the ideological heart of Beirut's bourgeois modernity.[13] The area's transformation into a militarised 'warscape' signalled the collapse of Beirut's cosmopolitan façade, exposing the sectarian and class divisions that underpinned the nation's fragile stability. At the centre of it all stood the Holiday Inn, watching, contested, impossible to ignore.

the vertical battlefield: the holiday inn and the politics of height

'You're about to be welcomed to one of the best hotels in the world,' promised the 1978 Holiday Inn commercial.[14] 'The hotels with the best locations, near the things you want to be near.'[15] This advertisement captured the aspirations the Beirut Holiday Inn was meant to embody: luxury, internationalism, and spatial convenience. But in Beirut, the promise of panoramic luxury became a curse. Within a year of its opening, the hotel's 'best location' made it not a destination, but a target. As Beirut fractured into sectarian enclaves and the Green Line solidified, the Holiday Inn found itself positioned on contested high ground. Its

views extended over the coastline, the city centre, and the surrounding hotel district. What had been marketed as a panoramic asset was transformed into a military advantage [Fig. 01].



Figure 01.
Radial site plan of Beirut's hotel district showing the Holiday Inn's central position and its commanding views over the coastline, city centre, and adjacent hotels, with photographic vignettes illustrating key sightlines. Illustration: Endriana Audisho, 2025.

Militarily, this contest over elevation reflects what Weizman terms the *politics of verticality*. This spatial logic involves control exercised not only across horizontal boundaries but also vertically, from tunnels to rooftops and from sniper positions to airspace.[16] In *Hollow Land*, Weizman argues that architecture and planning have become 'tactical tools and the means of dispossession', operating through a layering of spatial regimes that allow for staggered control.[17] Within this framework, verticality is not metaphor. It is a physical and political infrastructure, the military colonisation of height and depth, of airspace and ground level, of what he calls an 'elastic geography'.[18]

In Beirut's hotel district, this vertical logic was violently enacted. As militias battled for territorial control, they moved upward and turned high-rise towers such as the Phoenicia, the Murr Tower, and the Holiday Inn into instruments of combat. 'The Holiday Inn would be central to this battle', write Kenneth Morrison and Abdallah El Binni.[19] Standing twenty-six storeys high with generous balconies and a rooftop restaurant, it offered commanding views across multiple frontlines. Militants used its upper floors to launch sniper fire and observe enemy movements, exchanging heavy artillery with Murabitoun forces in the Murr Tower.[20] Control of the Holiday Inn granted tactical visibility. As Anthony Youssef notes, it became 'a critical node within a system of urban warfare', enabling occupants to 'possess and dominate' the surrounding landscape.[21] Its rooftop, once a symbol of leisure, became a military fortress. 'Control the Holiday Inn and you control the region around', declared one reporter.[22] The battle was no longer about territory as surface. It had become a context of volume, where sovereignty was asserted through height and surveillance.[23]

The Holiday Inn's symbolism heightened its strategic importance. More than a building, it was an international chain hotel, a modernist icon of Lebanon's mid-century ambitions, and a visible landmark dominating the coastal skyline. As Camillo Boano and Dalia Chabarek note, the 'line of hotels and towers overlooking the area dominate the landscape', with the Holiday Inn 'loom[ing] large' over the battle below.[24] Its architectural prominence made it both a prize and a target, an emblem of modernity to be claimed or destroyed. The Battle of the Hotels was waged floor by floor, corridor by corridor, stairwell by stairwell. As Sara Fregonese remarked, 'the militia fighters started moving upwards', inaugurating a spatial logic of conflict that transformed modernist towers into scaffolds of violence.[25]

In this context, Weizman's theory of verticality is not abstract but materially grounded in Beirut's fractured skyline. The Holiday Inn exemplifies how buildings become war machines, not only sheltering combatants but extending the battlefield vertically, stratifying urban space, and reorganising the city's spatial and symbolic order. It was not

merely occupied. It was instrumentalised. In Beirut's vertical battlefield, architecture became strategy, and vision became power.

the occupied interior: architecture and the logics of war

If height transformed the Holiday Inn into a strategic stronghold, it was its interior that sustained its prolonged militarisation. From lobby to rooftop, the hotel's architecture was rapidly reprogrammed for war. Its volumetric complexity, modernist features, and generous spatial dimensions created both opportunity and vulnerability. As combatants moved vertically, they also advanced horizontally through the building. They occupied it room by room and stair by stair, rewriting the hotel's spatial logic in response to shifting tactical demands. Completed in 1974 by Maurice Hindie and André Wogenscky, the Holiday Inn was a late-modernist icon. Its plan was ambitious: a twenty-six-storey tower with a separate eight-storey annex, four underground levels, a cinema, rooftop restaurant, and more than 500 rooms. Perched on a steep incline in Ain Mreisseh, it cascaded toward the Mediterranean in a concrete mass.

But its grandeur made its collapse more symbolic. Within days of the onset of the Battle of the Hotels, the Holiday Inn's interior was transformed into a battlefield. Militias occupied the building not just for its height, but for the spatial affordances it offered inside: wide corridors, thick concrete walls, open-plan lobbies, and modular rooms [Fig. 02]. Designed for service and convenience, these features now enabled concealment, defence, and lethal mobility. Corridors became safe passageways, sheltering fighters from enemy fire; stairwells, often the only means of movement once electricity was lost, were strategic choke points. 'There was a corridor there, with blue carpet [...] We used to sit in the corridor,' recalled one former fighter.[26] The modularity of hotel rooms, designed for repetition and convenience, now enabled guerrilla tactics. Floors became layered zones of occupation: 'like a club sandwich,' one veteran remembered, 'one floor us, one floor them, one floor us.'[27] Combat took place in the thresholds between these units, transforming once-private suites into contested terrain.

The architecture of the hotels became an instrument in what Boano and Chabarek describe as a 'militarised dialogue' between opposing forces.[28] Each corridor, doorway, and window served not only as a spatial threshold but as a vector of communication and violence, turning interior circulation systems into tactical infrastructures. The vertical occupation produced a brutal reciprocity, fought floor by floor and view by view, where each movement triggered counter-movement in the city's newly weaponised spatial language.[29] The building's internal complexity further intensified



Figure 02.
Plan and sectional perspective of the Holiday Inn illustrating its complex interior organisation and circular routes that complicated control during the Battle of the Hotels. Illustration: Endriana Audisho, 2025.

the risks. ‘Holding the Holiday Inn was very difficult,’ recalled one Kataeb fighter.[30] ‘The hotel had so many entrances and exits—the garage, the first floor, the lobby—that it was very hard to hold them all. Often, and this happened to me, we would walk down one floor because there was no elevator and come face to face with the enemy!’[31] Electricity and food supplies initially allowed some degree of self-sufficiency; generators powered outdoor spotlights, and the rooms — some of which had never been used — still held soft sheets and functioning televisions. But these amenities did little to offset the chaos unfolding within. The Holiday Inn’s interior was not only a site of military occupation but a labyrinth of unexpected encounters and sudden violence, its spatial legibility dissolving under the pressures of war.

The building’s materiality offered both protection and entrapment. Rocket-Propelled Grenades and recoilless rifles punctured the façade but rarely penetrated its concrete core.[32] ‘Small arms fire pockmarked the Holiday Inn [...] without penetrating their cinderblock and thin, white rock curtain walls,’ note Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price.[33] Militiamen turned these wounds into tactical apertures, enlarging holes for sniper positions, often concealed behind sandbags [Fig. 03]. Windows and bathroom skylights became loopholes: ‘We transformed the



Figure 03.
Axonometric drawing of the Holiday Inn with exploded views of hotel rooms and balconies, showing how the building’s spatial depth and stacked sandbags enabled concealed sniper movement and fortified occupation during the Battle of the Hotels. Illustration: Endriana Audisho, 2025.

bathroom skylights into loopholes,' one fighter explained, and 'used the debris to build noise traps so we could hear approaching attackers.'[34] Luxury suites became command posts. Lobbies became staging grounds. The infrastructure of hospitality was disassembled and retooled into a system of war.

This transformation was both tactical and symbolic. The Holiday Inn's lavish interiors, including chandeliers, minibars, and plush furnishings, were ransacked and destroyed. As Yasmina Ayuch documents, these were not acts of opportunism alone but of classed retribution. Many fighters had never stepped inside such spaces before the war: 'They destroyed all of the luxurious spaces and objects [...] as an expression of their opposition towards the upper class of the society and capitalism.'[35] The hotel's wealth, once inaccessible, became a site for the performance of revenge. This symbolic dismantling underscores Colomina's argument in *Privacy and Publicity* that there is no interior without a system of publicity.[36] The modern interior, she argues, is always mediated through mechanisms of display and representation rather than existing as a purely private realm.[37] In this sense, the Holiday Inn's suites, already staged as cosmopolitan spectacles before the war, were not only militarised but violently stripped of their representational role. The interior collapsed as both material space and spectacle, inverted through conflict.

Yet this dismantling was uneven. In the early stages of the battle, vestiges of the hotel's original function remained. Electricity still flowed, and elevators moved troops, weapons, and supplies between floors. When the power failed, fighters retreated upward, using linen stockpiles and untouched amenities to maintain temporary domesticity. 'The rooms, some of which had never been used [...] the soft sheets on the beds were new,' recalled one combatant.[38] 'The state-of-the-art televisions still broadcast entertainment programs that allowed them rare moments of respite.'[39] But these traces quickly gave way to ruin. On upper floors, dividing walls were torn down and suites stripped to concrete shells. 'From the upper floors and lush corridors,' wrote Silve-Dautremer, 'there are only ghostly rooms opening onto the Mediterranean [...] the countless bullet holes read like a musical score.'[40] Gilles Khoury compared the scene to a 'never-ending construction site.'[41] The aesthetic of late modernism, with its repetition, abstraction, and concrete massing, produced unintended consequences. Hospitality blurred into hostility.[42]

Weizman's spatial theory helps articulate these conditions. In *Hollow Land*, he argues that the built environment is not just passively damaged by conflict but weaponised through the manipulation of spatial form. Architectural features become 'tactical tools,' used to organise control and resistance across vertical and interior dimensions.[43] The Holiday Inn's volumetric complexity, its thresholds and partitions, and its nested circulation routes all enabled a form of conflict that was inseparable from the building's design. These spatial tactics were not ephemeral. A once-classified 1979 report, *Military Operations in Select Lebanese Built-Up Areas*, commissioned by the US Department of Defense, analysed the Holiday Inn as a case study in high-rise urban warfare.[44] It mapped building typologies, vertical movement, and patterns of occupation. What began as a tactical improvisation evolved into a prototype for future military doctrine.

The internal collapse of spatial clarity mirrored the fragmentation of the city beyond. As militias turned corridors into kill zones and bedrooms into bunkers, the architecture absorbed the war's fluid, unstable, and internally divided logic. Weizman describes this as a 'territorial hologram,' in which civilian and military, public and private, built and ruined, blur.[45] The Holiday Inn embodied this collapse. Its interiors reflected not only occupation but the dissolution of social and spatial order. By March 1976, when leftist forces finally seized the Holiday Inn, the interior was no longer recognisable. Smoke billowed from broken walls, the façades blackened and bullet pocked. 'Sixteen rightist gunmen were left [...] many were slain,' reported James Markham.[46]

'More than a dozen were shot down as they tried to flee. At least two defenders were thrown to their deaths from upper floors.'[47] A flag was hoisted over the charred structure in an act that marked both victory and eulogy. The Holiday Inn was never reopened. Today, its skeletal frame remains visible in the Beirut skyline, a decaying relic of the war and a monument to the transformation of architecture under siege.

case study two — the mediatised interior: the al-rashid hotel, baghdad

operation desert storm: mediating war from the al-rashid hotel

Midnight, 16 January 1991, was the deadline issued by the United Nations Security Council for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which began on 2 August 1990, stemmed from complex economic and territorial disputes, including Iraq's longstanding territorial claims over Kuwait, accusations of oil theft, and tensions over unpaid debts incurred during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). Kuwait's refusal to forgive those debts intensified the conflict.[48] Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz framed these grievances as justification for what Iraq considered the reclamation of lost territory and access to a Gulf port.[49]

As the deadline approached, news organisations such as CNN, ABC, NBC, and CBS raced to deploy correspondents to the region, determined to broadcast the first images of the conflict.[50] Despite advancements in video technology, many doubted live frontline reporting would be achievable, given strict censorship and news management imposed by Iraq, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Great Britain.[51] Unlike the relative freedom of the Vietnam War era, the Gulf War enforced 'pool' reporting, military minders, and pre-approved content, delaying and filtering journalistic output.[52] Pentagon officials were explicit: this would not be 'another Vietnam', where uncensored coverage was blamed for undermining US public support.[53] Yet the Gulf War marked a decisive development



Figure 04.
Site plan situating the Al-Rashid Hotel relative to CNN's area of coverage in Baghdad, with attention to the directionality and orientation of journalist John Holliman's speculative observation of distant smoke. Illustration: Endriana Audisho, 2025.

in the relationship between media and conflict. Technological advances such as satellite communications, GPS, and real-time broadcast capability enabled continuous global coverage. CNN, founded in 1980, positioned itself to capitalise on this shift, determined to deliver twenty-four-hour live reports from the war zone.

At the centre of this transformation was Baghdad's Al-Rashid Hotel. Completed in 1982 during the Iran-Iraq War as a symbol of Iraq's stability, the fourteen-storey hotel was originally constructed to host the Non-Aligned Movement conference, later relocated due to regional instability. Its location in Baghdad's city centre made it a logical base for the foreign press [Fig. 04]. When Iraq failed to withdraw by the UN deadline, the US-led coalition launched 'Operation Desert Storm' on 17 January 1991, marking the official start of the Gulf War. From the ninth floor of the Al-Rashid, CNN correspondents Bernard Shaw, Peter Arnett, and John Holliman — quickly dubbed the 'Boys of Baghdad' — broadcast live coverage of the war's opening hours.[54] Rival networks struggled

as they relied on local hotel phone lines that failed when the war began.[55] CNN, however, had secured a privileged four-wire telephone line, independent of Iraq's switchboard.[56] This advantage, reportedly arranged through CNN producer Robert Weiner's relationship with Iraqi Minister of Information Naji al-Hadithi, allowed CNN to maintain uninterrupted communication.[57] While other journalists sheltered in the hotel basement, CNN remained in their upper-floor suite, providing live audio reports. In the days that followed, the Al-Rashid Hotel became a key node in the war's media infrastructure. Its interiors were reconfigured to support continuous, real-time coverage, an unprecedented development in the history of journalism.

eye-witnessing from the interior ('something is happening outside')

CNN made journalism history with the first conflict broadcast live and continuously. Its twenty-four-hour coverage across global time zones marked a significant shift. As CNN's Ed Turner noted, news is dead if not delivered 'within the same time cycle.'[58] Continuous, unedited coverage created a sense of immediacy, positioning viewers alongside reporters with 'front-row seats' to war. As Peter Arnett reflected, 'It's pretty unique in journalistic history to have a front-row seat to one of the great air bombardments in history.'[59] This front-row experience was reinforced by CNN's Atlanta anchor Susan Rock, who reminded audiences that 'we are seeing this video as you are [...] it is important that you see it immediately.'[60] The alignment between reporter and viewer created the illusion of shared presence in real-time, as though the audience occupied the same room. This dynamic transformed both journalism and public engagement with conflict, as the need for constant sensation and rolling news became an integral part of contemporary consumer culture.[61]

Yet this breakthrough in journalism also exposed the fragility of real-time reporting. The coverage, though live, was transmitted primarily through audio, with commentary forming the main evidentiary base. The reporters themselves were eye-witnessing the conflict from within the hotel's interior, but for global audiences their observations were mediated aurally, collapsing visual witnessing into sound. As Stephen Cushion and Justin Lewis observe, reporters operating through live, unscripted formats become 'almost like witnesses at the scene of an accident [...] forced to speculate on what they could see.'[62] For the 'Boys of Baghdad', confinement to their hotel suite transformed eye witnessing into a speculative, spatially restricted act, limited to observing the city through the architectural boundaries of their hotel room. The result was a constant negotiation between the discipline of journalistic objectivity and the unavoidable subjectivity of first-person, continuous reporting.

Fear, uncertainty, and moments of banter surfaced throughout the broadcast, underscoring this tension. As the opening airstrikes began, Shaw exclaimed, 'It has been one hell of a night [...] when the bombs fell and exploded, it shook you to your soul.'[63] At another moment, Holliman joked that Shaw had retreated downstairs to safety, but 'We like the view higher up.'[64] Moments later, the gravity of the situation returned: 'It's very quiet outside [...] a few cars speeding down the main drag [...] no more anti-aircraft fire.'[65] The reporters' vulnerability frequently clashed with the demands of their task. Shaw's eerie description of the city — 'The sky over Baghdad is black [...] there is a cool breeze blowing through the window here' — followed by 'It occurs to me that I didn't get dinner tonight', with Arnett adding, 'We have tuna fish, crackers, and water.'[66] These fragments of casual conversation underscored the psychological strain of continuous live reporting under siege, as the domestic interior of the hotel room collapsed into the spectacle and uncertainty of war.

The Al-Rashid Hotel itself shaped the conditions of this reporting. Its location in Baghdad's city centre offered prime visibility but also imposed spatial and visual constraints. Eight hours into the coverage, Holliman looked outside an eastern-facing window and described a distant smoke cloud: 'It could be an oil refinery, could be a chemical factory.'[67] Despite being physically present in Baghdad, the correspondents

remained spatially distanced, confined within the architecture of the hotel. As Arnett later explained, 'We can report to you basically what we can see from this hotel [...] we can actually see a lot, but we can't look south of the border of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia.'[68] The hotel's elongated, north-south orientation, with windows oriented only to the east and west, further restricted their field of vision. Environmental conditions compounded this ambiguity. As smoke drifted across the skyline, Holliman reported, 'There is a huge cloud of white smoke pouring out [...] it has made it very difficult for us to see outside of our windows.'[69] The city beyond remained unseen, described only through sound, flickering light, and speculation. When power failed across Baghdad, explosions provided the only illumination. 'The sky is lighting up to the south [...] we can only presume there is another attack coming in,' they reported.[70] Their language exposed the speculative and uncertain nature of witnessing war from within the hotel's interior.

As the hotel room shed its function as a site of temporary accommodation, it became a generic, spatially constrained interior that had to be actively navigated to construct an external narrative. The interior and its archetypes became the instruments of reportage [Fig. 05]. The 1.2 m high by 3.8 m wide strip window framed the act of eye witnessing; the 4m by 7.5 m hotel room operated as a makeshift broadcast studio; the 2.5 m wide corridor became a passage for repositioning within the interior, offering access to alternative orientations and fragmented panoramas of the city. The limits of visibility and the spatial organisation of the Al-Rashid directly shaped the reporting, with correspondents repeatedly referencing the hotel's architecture to ground their commentary [Fig. 06]. 'We're going over to the window now to see what we can see,' Holliman announced minutes into the coverage, followed quickly by, 'I'm getting away from the window here now,' as crackling sounds interrupted the report.[71] This choreography of approaching and retreating underscored the window's dual role as both aperture and threshold, simultaneously affording vision and exposing danger. This condition exemplifies what Colomina identifies as the modern picture window: 'it turns the outside world into an image to be consumed by those inside [...] but it also displays the image of the interior to that of the world.'[72] CNN's broadcasts depended on this reciprocity: the reporters consumed Baghdad as image through the window, while global audiences consumed the hotel interior staged as the new front line.



Figure 05.
Axonometric of the Al-Rashid Hotel connecting its rooms and windows to CNN's broadcast infrastructure of control rooms, satellites, and domestic televisions. Illustration: Endriana Audisho, 2025.

The corridor, typically a mundane element of circulation, became crucial for repositioning. 'I'm going to crawl [via the corridor] to the other side of the hotel,' Shaw remarked, seeking an alternative vantage.[73] At one point, Holliman extended his microphone cord to 'travel more distance through this place and give you a better outlook from all sides of the hotel.'[74] Here, 'outlook' referred not to vision, but to audio transmission, as the microphone was held outside the window. Ultimately, the spatial boundaries of the hotel conditioned how Baghdad was seen, heard, and speculatively described. 'We don't know how much of the city has been targeted, but nothing near the hotel,' Holliman observed, exposing the proximity limits of their field of view.[75] The correspondents used the building boundary as



Figure 06.
Plan of the Al-Rashid Hotel's ninth floor showing reporters' vantage points and movements during live coverage of the Gulf War. Illustration: Endriana Audisho, 2025.

a perimeter from which to survey what little they could. At times, when it became unsafe to approach the windows, Shaw narrated their dislocated vantage: 'To paint the picture for you of where we are physically right now, we are in the hall, on the floor, and we can look at open hotel doors to see either side [of the hotel], and it has suddenly fallen quiet again over the skies of Baghdad.'[76]

Within these architectural boundaries, reporting collapsed into a choreography of partial views, nervous repositioning, and speculative commentary. The Al-Rashid was no longer simply a hotel; its interiors framed a volatile spatial logic where journalism, spectacle, and warfare converged. Bernard Shaw's now-iconic statement captured this ambiguity: 'Something is happening outside.'[77] The phrase tethered the hotel's interior to the conflict beyond, yet exposed the speculative, disembodied nature of their engagement. Without direct access to the frontlines, the correspondents navigated both space and language from within the hotel's confines, waiting for the visible evidence of war to breach their narrow field of perception. In doing so, they transformed the Al-Rashid from a temporary shelter into a media apparatus. It became an architectural threshold through which the spectacle of real-time war was constructed and transmitted to a global audience.

As Colomina later argued in *Domesticity at War*, during the Gulf War 'CNN literally advertised itself with "CNN brings you the frontline to your living room" [...] The war that is the domestic both occupies and is about this complex space.'[78] The Al-Rashid suite exemplified this condition: its strip windows framed vision, its walls and corridors supported the infrastructure of transmission, and its furnishings were repurposed as a broadcast studio. The hotel room thus operated simultaneously as stage and apparatus, collapsing distance between battlefield and domesticity and tethering the spectacle of war to a familiar typology of everyday life.

the spectacle of war: real-time, simulation, and the disappearance of space

If the interiors of the Al-Rashid Hotel defined the spatial limits of CNN's reporting, it was the architecture of the screen that shaped how the war was consumed globally. The hotel's physical boundaries were transposed onto the mediated distance of the screen. CNN's opening line, 'We're going to Baghdad now because we can,' set up a seductive proposition: that proximity to conflict was now achievable in real-time.[79] Yet early coverage was saturated with absence. Despite reporting from Baghdad, CNN's broadcasts offered no real images of the conflict. Instead, audio fragments were layered over vague diagrams, outdated maps, and static graphics that predated the war. Even the iconic phosphor-green night-vision footage that aired days after the initial airstrikes undermined the idea of liveness.[80]

The screen functioned as both conduit and filter. While it promised to bring Baghdad into the homes of a global audience, it simultaneously constructed distance. This was a mode of viewing mediated through what Virilio terms *teleobservation*.[81] This distance emerged not only from physical separation but also from the fragmented medium. CNN's coverage oscillated between disconnected audio, transposed visuals, and multiple correspondent locations, with sterile maps of Iraq and Baghdad serving as placeholders. These maps offered a view of Baghdad as abstracted zones — the Al-Rashid Hotel, the Presidential Palace, the International Communications Centre — never as a lived city under siege.

This visual strategy aligned with what Baudrillard describes as *simulation*: the substitution of signs for the real, where the representation becomes detached from any original referent.[82] Unlike representation, which attempts to reflect reality, simulation collapses that distinction, constructing what Baudrillard terms *hyperreality*.[83] In the Gulf War, Baghdad was consumed through speculative maps, diagrammatic overlays, and disjointed live feeds. The city was reduced to signs at a distance, and the coverage itself became a deterrence to the real image of war. Baudrillard argued that the flood of images and commentary fragmented perception, leaving no time for reflection.[84] War became less about evidence, more about interpretation.

Real-time broadcasting amplified this effect. Virilio's critique of *real-time* underscores this shift, arguing that what happens more quickly is perceived less clearly. In the Gulf War, real space was displaced by real-time spectacle, and geography was overtaken by what Virilio terms *dromology*, a logic of speed.[85] The boundary between 'here' and 'there' collapsed into a two-dimensional spectacle with a third dimension of time represented by CNN's rolling broadcast. It became, as Virilio put it, 'a world war in miniature,' mediated entirely by the screen.[86] Images and sounds moved too quickly to be analysed, reducing violence to its simplest form: an image.[87] Traditional logics of perception broke down, and the virtual world prevailed over the real one.

Baudrillard pushed further, claiming provocatively with the title of his book that 'The Gulf War Did Not Take Place.'[88] He pointed to the lack of real images, the absence of Iraqi perspectives, and delayed footage as evidence of the war's transformation into hyperreality. He asked, 'How is it that a real war did not generate real images?'[89] The grainy phosphor-green imagery that came to be emblematic of the Gulf War intensified this sense of abstraction, producing what *The New Yorker* described as an 'eerie, remote control quality.'[90] For Baudrillard, the war became a *non-event*, a war turned into pure information and endless speculation.[91] Viewers became, in his words, 'hostages of media intoxication,' trapped in a voyeuristic relation to the war and bombarded by the technological sublime of real-time transmission.[92] The screen was no longer a neutral interface but a site of power that shaped perception and produced political subjectivities. Virilio warned that we must 'not believe our eyes.'[93] The electronic war, he argued, is not neutral. It is a war of images and sounds that has displaced earlier forms of warfare and restructured the politics of vision itself.[94]

In this light, the Gulf War's mediated interior reveals a new spatial logic of conflict, where architecture is not a passive backdrop but an active participant in the global media apparatus. The spatial constraints of the Al-Rashid, coupled with the temporal compression of real-time broadcast, produced a spectacle in which the city was consumed more as fragmented simulation than as a material reality. Ultimately, the Al-Rashid Hotel reveals how questions of visibility, occupation, and representation converge in ways that disrupt and reorganise the spatial and political order of the city.

conclusion: war rooms and the architecture of conflict

In times of war, hotel interiors — designed for comfort, transience, and cosmopolitan aspiration — undergo radical transformation. In Beirut and Baghdad, architecture did not collapse under conflict; it adapted, becoming both durable and vulnerable. The Holiday Inn was converted into a vertical stronghold, its corridors and modular rooms sustaining prolonged occupation and classed retribution. The Al-Rashid, by contrast, became a mediatised control room, its strip windows and suites conditioning how the war was narrated and consumed in real time. These episodes reveal interiors as contingent infrastructures, where the plan dissolves into a choreography of improvised action, visibility, and survival.

To make sense of these transformations, this essay develops and advances composite analytic drawing as both method and critique. By assembling fragments — photographs, transcripts, memories — into spatial accounts, these drawings do not merely illustrate but interpret. They foreground absence, speculation, and contradiction as intrinsic to documenting interiors under siege. In doing so, they push representational practice beyond idealised plans and perspectives, offering interior discourse a way of working with instability, speed, and contingency.

The hotel interior, then, is not a backdrop to crisis but a volatile interface between design and improvisation, privacy and politics, materiality and spectacle. Situated within the call of *Unplanned Interiors*, these cases resonate more broadly: whether shaped by conflict, political unrest, or climatic disruption, interiors are continually rewritten by forces they cannot anticipate but must nonetheless contain. War rooms remind us that the task of interior discourse lies not only in the plan but in confronting the unplanned, where architecture is forged as much through rupture as through design.

acknowledgements

This essay was produced with research funding from the Faculty of Design and Society at the University of Technology Sydney. I am grateful to my Research Assistants, Jacqueline Tran and Shuang Wu, whose contributions at different stages of this project were invaluable. Their visual and technical insight has been instrumental in articulating the spatial analyses explored in this research. I also extend my thanks to the photographers, artists, journalists, and archives whose images informed the composite drawings and spatial reconstructions in this essay: Stavro Jabra, Roman Robroek, Joseph Chami, Georges Boustany, Saleh Rifai, British Pathé, Annahar, The Associated Press, CNN, and Al Jazeera. Their documentation of the events and environments examined here made this work possible.

author biography

Dr Endriana Audisho is a lecturer and public programs director at the School of Architecture, University of Technology Sydney (UTS). Her research and teaching practice draw on post-colonial and decolonial frameworks to expose spatial and social injustices, while also proposing alternative architectural narratives, fictions, and imaginaries.

notes

1 See Kenneth Morrison and Abdallah El Binni, *War Hotels* (Merrion Press, 2022), which traces the histories of hotels repurposed during conflicts across various geopolitical contexts.

2 Mayssa Jallad, *Beirut's Civil War Hotel District: Preserving the World's First High-Rise Urban Battlefield* (unpublished Master's thesis, Columbia University, 2017), pp. 1–187 (p. 46) <https://www.academia.edu/67034614> [accessed 30 April 2025].

3 Camillo Boano and Dalia Chabarek, 'A Stroll Down Memory Lane: The Battle of the Hotels,' *The Journal of Space Syntax*, 4.1 (2013), pp. 130–135 (p. 132), www.academia.edu/6826245 [accessed 30 April 2025].

4 Boano and Chabarek, 'A Stroll Down Memory Lane,' p. 132.

5 Al Jazeera English, 'How the Holiday Inn Became a Symbol of the Lebanese Civil War | War Hotels,' YouTube, 4 December 2018 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4DTGFcjRrQ4> [accessed 5 June 2025] (from 07:45).

6 Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (Pluto Press, 2012), p. 198.

7 Jallad, *Beirut's Civil War Hotel District*, pp. 2–3.

8 Boano and Chabarek, 'A Stroll Down Memory Lane,' p. 132.

9 Paul A. Jureidini, R. D. McLaurin, and James M. Price, *Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-Up Areas, 1975–1978* (Abbott Associates Inc., 1979), pp. i–56 (p. 5) <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADB040213> [accessed 30 April 2025].

10 Jallad, *Beirut's Civil War Hotel District*, p. 56.

11 Morrison and El Binni, *War Hotels*, p. 108.

12 Morrison and El Binni, *War Hotels*, p. 108.

13 Nadine Hindi, 'Recurrent Warscape in Beirut Public Spaces: Forty Years Later (1975–2015),' *International Planning History Society Proceedings*, 17.4 (2016), pp. 157–166 (p. 160), doi.org/10.7480/iphs.2016.4.1288.

14 Bionic Disco, 'Holiday Inn "Welcomes You" Commercial – 1978,' YouTube, 3 December 2013 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C1q2XAZSSn8> [accessed 20 June 2025] (from 0:02).

15 Bionic Disco, 'Holiday Inn "Welcomes You" Commercial – 1978,' from 0:08.

16 Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (Verso, 2007), p. 15.

17 Weizman, *Hollow Land*, p. 5.

18 Weizman, *Hollow Land*, p. 6.

19 Morrison and El Binni, *War Hotels*, p. 108.

20 Jallad, *Beirut's Civil War Hotel District*, p. 51.

21 Anthony Youssef, *Meaning (a)drift: The Movement in the Holiday Inn Beirut's Socio-Political Narrative* (unpublished Master's thesis, Carleton University, 2022), pp. 1–84 (p. 9) <https://www.academia.edu/85801802/Meaning_A_Drift_The_Movement_in_the_Holiday_Inn_Beiruts_Socio_Political_Narrative> [accessed 30 April 2025].

22 Al Jazeera English, 'How the Holiday Inn Became a Symbol of the Lebanese Civil War,' from 19:54.

23 Eyal Weizman, 'The Politics of Verticality,' *Mute*, 12 January 2004 <https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/politics-verticality#> [accessed 20 April 2025].

24 Boano and Chabarek, 'A Stroll Down Memory Lane,' p. 131.

25 Al Jazeera English, 'How the Holiday Inn Became a Symbol of the Lebanese Civil War,' from 17:13.

26 Georges Boustany, 'Beirut Holiday Inn – April 6, 2000,' YouTube, 18 November 2017 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nFLrXVnM1Uw> [accessed 23 June 2025] (from 7:08).

27 Marguerite Silve-Dautremer, 'Beyrouth. Les fantômes de la guerre hantent le "Holiday Inn",' *Orient XXI*, 1 June 2020 <https://orientxxi.info/magazine/beyrouth-les-fantomes-de-la-guerre-hantent-le-holiday-inn,3922> [accessed 30 April 2025].

28 Boano and Chabarek, 'A Stroll Down Memory Lane,' p. 132.

29 Boano and Chabarek, 'A Stroll Down Memory Lane,' p. 132.

30 Silve-Dautremer, 'Beyrouth.'

31 Silve-Dautremer, 'Beyrouth.'

32 Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, *Military Operations*, p. 8.

33 Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, *Military Operations*, p. 8.

34 Silve-Dautremer, 'Beyrouth.'

35 Yasmina Alexandra Ayuch, *The Holiday Inn Beirut: An Unintentional Monument of the Lebanese Civil War* (unpublished academic paper, 2019), pp. 1–18 (p. 7) <https://www.academia.edu/114076228/The_Holiday_Inn_Beirut_An_Unintentional_Monument_of_the_Lebanese_Civil_War> [accessed 30 April 2025].

36 Beatriz Colomina, *Privacy and Publicity: Modern Architecture as Mass Media* (MIT Press, 1994), p. 9.

37 Colomina, *Privacy and Publicity*, pp. 13–14.

38 Silve-Dautremer, 'Beyrouth.'

39 Silve-Dautremer, 'Beyrouth.'

40 Silve-Dautremer, 'Beyrouth.'

41 Gilles Khoury, 'Au Holiday Inn, le passé irrésolu de Beyrouth,' *L'Orient-Le Jour*, 19 February 2024 <https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1368466/au-holiday-inn-le-passe-irresolu-de-beyrouth.html> [accessed 30 April 2025].

42 Silve-Dautremer, 'Beyrouth.'

43 Weizman, *Hollow Land*, p. 5.

44 Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, *Military Operations*, p. 8.

45 Weizman, 'The Politics of Verticality.'

46 James M. Markham, 'Beirut Leftists Seize Holiday Inn in Heavy Assault,' *The New York Times*, 22 March 1976 <https://www.nytimes.com/1976/03/22/archives/beirut-leftists-seize-holiday-inn-in-heavy-assault.html> [accessed 30 April 2025].

47 Markham, 'Beirut Leftists Seize Holiday Inn in Heavy Assault.'

48 Michael Klare, 'Arms Transfers to Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–88 and the Origins of the Gulf War,' *Middle East Report*, 170 (1991), p. 14.

49 Milton Viorst, 'Report from Baghdad,' *The New Yorker*, 21 June 1991 <https://archives.newyorker.com/newyorker/1991-06-24/flipbook/054> [accessed 23 June 2025].

50 Jeremy Gerard, 'TV Reporting Recalls Radio Day,' *The New York Times*, 9 August 1990 <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/09/arts/tv-reporting-recalls-radio-days.html?searchResultPosition=1> [accessed 23 June 2025].

51 William Finnegan, 'The Talk of the Town,' *The New Yorker*, n.d.

52 Finnegan, 'The Talk of the Town.'

53 *Los Angeles Times*, 'Text of Bush's Address to Nation: "The World Could Wait No Longer",' 17 January 1991 <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-01-17-mn-463-story.html> [accessed 23 June 2025].

54 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 2,' YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7dv7aCudtHk> [accessed 20 May 2025] (from 0:05:08).

55 Howard Kurtz, 'On Television, Gunfire is Heard, But Not Seen,' *The Washington Post*, 17 January 1991 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/01/17/on-television-gunfire-is-heard-but-not-seen/ea2f6235-d298-48e3-a17f-59883c27aae0/>

[accessed 23 June 2025].

56 Edwin Diamond, 'CNN's Triumph,' *New York Magazine*, 24.4 (1991), p. 20.

57 Bill Carter, '"Baghdad" Looks Back and Ahead,' *The New York Times*, 18 November 2002 <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/18/arts/baghdad-looks-back-and-ahead.html> [accessed 24 June 2025].

58 Roxanne Roberts, 'CNN, On Top of the World,' *The Washington Post*, 1 August 1990 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1990/08/21/cnn-on-top-of-the-world/3058d858-af45-40bc-9a32-586c811b4376/> [accessed 24 June 2025].

59 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 2,' YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7dv7aCudtHk> [accessed 20 May 2025] (from 1:42:49).

60 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 4,' YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5X-AqZkgI0g> [accessed 20 May 2025] (from 1:27:33).

61 Stephen Cushion and Justin Lewis, *The Rise of 24-Hour News Television: Global Perspectives* (Peter Lang, 2010), p. 3.

62 Cushion and Lewis, *The Rise of 24-Hour News Television*, p. 18.

63 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 3,' YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1DFuV13Z4IQ> [accessed 20 May 2025] (from 15:13).

64 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 1,' YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vn8mfg_oEz4> [accessed 20 May 2025] (from 35:49).

66 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 1,' from 56:43; 57:20; 57:27.

67 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 5,' YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_AGqikQ4wg> [accessed 20 May 2025] (from 1:19:25).

68 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 7,' YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=21u1bZdqqwc> [accessed 20 May 2025] (from 1:12:44).

69 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 4,' from 36:24.

70 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 1,' from 19:49.

71 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 1,' from 2:20; 3:18.

72 Colomina, *Privacy and Publicity*, p. 9.

73 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 1,' from 1:17:53.

74 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 5,' from 51:32.

75 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 1,' from 26:05.

76 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 1,' from 1:44:28.

77 Howard Kurtz, 'Bernard Shaw, Under Siege,' *The Washington Post*, 22 January 1991 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1991/01/22/bernard-shaw-under-siege/339c65c3-ff26-41fa-9ffe-8b274aae2fb0/> [accessed 23 June 2025].

78 Beatriz Colomina, *Domesticity at War* (MIT Press, 2007), p. 297.

79 HDiNDEMAND, 'Operation Desert Storm - CNN Live News Coverage - Part 1,' from 0:44.

80 Andrew Hoskins, *Televising War: From Vietnam to Iraq* (Continuum, 2004), p. 24.

81 Paul Virilio, *The Lost Dimension*, trans. by Daniel Moshenberg (New York, Semiotext(e)), p.31.

82 Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, trans. by Sheila Glaser (University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 1.

83 Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, p. 1.

84 Jean Baudrillard, *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*, trans. by Paul Patton (Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 67.

85 Paul Virilio, *Architecture Principe, M Documents 3: The Function of the Oblique* (Architectural Association, 1996), p. 13.

86 Paul Virilio, *A Landscape of Events*, trans. by Julie Rose (MIT Press, 2000), p. 24.

87 Virilio, *Landscape of Events*, p. 26.

88 Baudrillard, *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*, title page.

89 Baudrillard, *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*, p. 82.

90 Finnegan, 'The talk of the town.'

91 Baudrillard, *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*, pp. 24–27; 41.

92 Baudrillard, *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*, pp. 25.

93 Paul Virilio, *Desert Screen: War at the Speed of Light*, trans. by Michael Degener (Continuum, 2002), p. 41.

94 Virilio, *The Vision Machine*, p. 69.